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International Wine Trade:
Analyzing the Value of Reputation and Quality Signals
Introduction
Driving issue for this research is to shed light on the factors behind price differentials seem-
ingly based on the origin of a product. Conventional approaches in international trade analysis stress
the importance of production cost, product quality, and strategic behavior and associate product ori-
gin with a reputation or quality measure. However, this may neglect the impact of subjective con-
sumer preferences based on marketing, advertising, brands or product loyalty. Advertising cam-
paigns for export promotion, such as those for American beef or Colombian coffee, reflect the rec-
ognition of policy-makers that establishing regional brands is an important way to boost exports. In
this paper, we apply a hedonic model to estimate the potential impact of regional origin on wine
prices controlling for blind-tasted sensory quality, variety, and producer quality signals in order to
assess their significance with respect to New World wine traded and sold in the US.
1 The theories
explaining the correlation between prices and regional origin include production costs approaches
with monopolistic competition (e.g. Helpman and Krugman, 1985), spatial models (e.g. Fujita et al.,
1999), quality differentiated product markets (e.g. Tirole, 1988), and reputation signaling (e.g. Sha-
piro, 1983). Other empirical approaches with specific applications to wine include Schamel (2000)
modeling product scarcity and Brooks (2001) modeling brand value and correcting for cost differ-
ences that transcend borders.
Quality signals are important price determinants for an experience good such as premium
wine, which is a highly differentiated good with numerous quality aspects. An objective quality
measure is very difficult to define. Many of the sensory indicators that determine expert quality rat-
ings are subjective.  Additional indicators, such as labeling, bottle design, or the reputation of pro-
ducers and regions may also advance or hinder the sale of a particular wine.  Frequently, it is ob-
served that wine prices may vary substantially despite very similar sensory quality attributes. For
                                                          
1 New World wine dominates the US market: about 77% of consumption is either from California or imported from
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, or South Africa. Recently, their market share increased steadily (Anderson
and Norman). Only 15% are from Europe and 8% from sources outside of California (Sumner et al.). We choose to ne-
glect other sources because of their different classification schemes (e.g. France by origin and not by variety).3
instance, wine from California's Napa Valley typically sells at a higher price than wine of compara-
ble sensory quality from another region.
We attempt to explain such observations by positing that reputation indicators, variety, and
regional origin affect wine purchase decisions. Because consumers are uncertain or do not have suf-
ficient information about quality, they are prepared to pay a much higher price for a reputable wine
from a well-known producer and/or region.  Moreover, given the limited attention that consumers
can expend, not all quality signals receive equal attention. We assume that the level of attention that
consumers pay to positive (negative) quality signals is higher for producers well above (below) their
average peer performance. Therefore, for a consumer, an unusually high/low quality demonstration
forms a lasting signal about a producer quality.
Main objective of the paper is to estimate a hedonic model evaluating the impact of positive
and negative producer quality signals as well as expert evaluations, regional origin, wine variety,
judging age on wine prices. From this, we are able to derive interesting marketing implications for
New World wine producers. We also draw some conclusions on interpreting the correlation between
prices and regional origin as brand value as opposed to a quality premium. Hedonic models posit
that the observed market price is the sum of implicit prices paid for quality attributes and wine is an
experience good with many defining quality attributes. Data source for this analysis are published
expert evaluation in the "Wine Spectator" magazine from 10/01 through 10/02 available online at
www.winespectator.com. Wine experts assign sensory quality ratings on a 100-point scale. From
these quality scores we derive an indicator of positive and negative producer quality demonstrations
based on the deviation from the average quality performance of producers within a region.  Model-
ing a unique indicator for a producer quality signal is a distinct feature of this empirical application.
Literature Review
A number of studies have applied hedonic models to estimate implicit prices for wine quality
and reputation attributes.  They are based on the notion that any product represents a bundle of char-
acteristics that define quality. Theoretical foundation is the seminal paper by Rosen (1974), which
posits that goods are valued for their utility-generating attributes. Rosen suggests that competitive
implicit markets define prices for embodied product attributes, and that consumers evaluate product4
attributes (e.g. features of a car, indicators of air or water quality) when making a purchase. The ob-
served market price is the sum of implicit prices paid for each quality attribute. Rosen also recog-
nizes an identification problem for supply and demand functions derived from hedonic models, be-
cause implicit prices are equilibrium prices jointly determined by supply and demand conditions.
Hence, implicit prices may reflect not only consumer preferences but also factors that determine
production. In order to solve the identification problem it is necessary to separate supply and demand
conditions. Arguea and Hsiao (1993) argue that identification is essentially a data issue which can be
avoided by pooling cross-section and time-series data specific to a particular side of the market.
Reputation indicators affects consumer willingness to pay since the quality of a bottle of wine
is not known until it is opened. In addition to sensory quality and variety, producer and collective
regional reputation indicators may also affect prices. Shapiro (1983) presents a theoretical frame-
work to examine the effects of individual producer reputation on prices. He develops an equilibrium
price-quality schedule, assuming competitive markets and imperfect consumer information. For con-
sumers, it is costly to improve their information about product quality. He demonstrates that reputa-
tion allows high-quality producers to sell their items at a premium that may be interpreted as return
on investments in reputation building. In such an environment of imperfect information, learning
about the reputation of a product can be an effective way for consumers to reduce their decision-
making costs. Expert evaluations may be an effective way for consumers to learn about reputation of
producers and/or regions.  Tirole (1996) presents a model of collective reputation as an aggregate of
individual reputations where current producer incentives are affected by their own actions and col-
lective actions of the past.  He derives the existence of stereotype producers from history depend-
ence, shows that new producers may suffer from past mistakes of older producers for a long time
after the latter disappear, and derives conditions under which the collective reputation can be re-
gained.
Nerlove (1995) studies the Swedish wine market with government-controlled prices, no do-
mestic production, and a small share of global consumption. He estimates a reduced form hedonic
model with exogenous prices (as opposed to supply assuming that Swedes reveal their valuation of a
particular wine quality attribute by varying the derived hedonic demand for it), regressing sold5
quantities on various quality attributes and prices. Combris, Lecocq and Visser (1997) estimate a
hedonic price equation and what is referred to as a jury grade equation to explain variations in price
and quality for Bordeaux wine.  Landon and Smith (1997, 1998) also analyze Bordeaux wine, fo-
cusing on a lagged reputation indicator in addition to sensory quality. In both papers, they use a he-
donic model to study the impact of current quality and reputation based on past quality demonstra-
tions.  Government and industry classifications define regional effects. Their main findings are:
reputation indicators have large price impacts; an established reputation is much more important
than short-term quality improvements; and ignoring reputation indicators will overstate the impact of
current quality on consumer behavior. In their 1997 paper, estimated coefficients vary substantially
across the vintages.
Roberts and Reagans (2001) examine market experience, consumer attention, and price-
quality relationships for New World wines in the U.S. market. They argue that producer or regional
quality signals improve with the duration of market exposure and evaluation by consumers.
Oczkowski (1994) estimates hedonic price function for premium Australian wines, examining six
attribute groups and various interaction terms. In another paper, he argues that single indicators of
wine quality and reputation are imperfect measures because tasters' evaluations differ and thus con-
tain measurement errors. Employing factor analysis and 2SLS, he finds significant reputation effects
but insignificant quality effects (Oczkowski, 2001).
Brooks (2001) argues that traditional views of international competitiveness emphasize prod-
uct quality and production cost and neglect the potential impact of marketing and brand development
on export demand. Applying hedonic regression analysis, she controls for vintage, blind-tasted qual-
ity, variety and also cost differences. Cross-country comparisons that suggest that neither cost nor
quality differences, but country “brands” affect a wine bottle’s price in excess of fifty percent. Cru-
cial for this conclusion is to interpret the premiums on regional dummies as a marketing premium as
opposed to a quality premium.
Schamel (2000) estimates a model including blind-tasted quality, variety, scarcity, and spe-
cial designations. The paper examines seven regions and two varieties (Cabernet Sauvignon and
Chardonnay).  The estimated price elasticity of sensory quality is larger for Chardonnay, indicating6
that consumers are willing to pay a higher quality premium compared to Cabernet Sauvignon. How-
ever, the other indicators including regional origin and scarcity seem to be more important to red
wine consumers. The results suggest that the public-good value of a regional appellation is higher for
red wine regions and that producers there may benefit more from collective marketing efforts. In
another paper, Schamel and Anderson (2001) evaluate wine quality and regional indicators for wines
from Australia and New Zealand.
In this paper, the focus is on regional and producer quality signals. Consumers willing to buy
wine but still uncertain about its quality despite expert opinions, have an idea about a producer’s
ability to deliver a quality wine based on average quality relative to regional peers. Their willingness
to pay also depends on maturing potential, age and relative scarcity of the wine. In addition, they
have quality perceptions about grape varieties and growing regions when forming their buying deci-
sions. To assess the significance of such subjective perceptions on New World wine trade, we apply
a hedonic model to estimate the impact of regional origin on prices controlling for blind-tasted sen-
sory quality, variety, and producer quality signals. Comparisons across regions and countries will
identify how origin affects wine prices. At least part of the estimated price premiums or discount due
to regional origin may be interpreted as a marketing premium as opposed to a quality premium or
discount if the variation in regional effects does not correspond with the regions having a better av-
erage quality.
Data and Analysis
Building on the seminal work by Rosen (1974), we propose a hedonic model where the price
of a particular wine (Pw) is a function of its attributes zj: Pw = Pw(z1, ..., zj, ..., zn).
2 We obtained a
detailed data set of New World wine sold in the U.S. that discerns wine quality assessments, regional
origin as well as producer quality signals.
3 In each issue, Wine Spectator magazine publishes prices
and ratings for sensory wine quality (Sq) and maturing potential (Pot) as well as special expert
                                                          
2 We neglect an exposition of hedonic pricing models, which are well documented in the literature (Nerlove 1995).
3 New World wines (California, Oregon, Chile, Australia, etc.) are labeled primarily by variety, while Old World wines
(France, Italy, Spain, etc.) are labeled primarily by their region of origin. Thus, the data set does not classify a "Cabernet
Sauvignon" from "Bordeaux", even though Bordeaux reds are made primarily from Cabernet. We would need to either
manually edit the data or to define a separate category for "Bordeaux styles." For this reason, we chose to neglect Old
World wines from the analysis which are about 15% of total U.S. consumption with a declining trend.7
selections (SS, BB). Dependent variable is the logarithm of a wine’s release price (P) in US$.
4 Using
the sensory wine quality ratings, we derive an indicator for high-end (He) and low-end (Le) quality
producers by calculating the deviation of a producer’s average quality rating from their respective
regional average. We then define dummy variables identifying high-end and low-end quality
producers, which deviate by more than two points from their respective peer average.
5
Further control variables in the model are availability (A), age (Age) and a categorical
dummy for wine variety (Va). The full data set, which we analyzed, includes the judging years 1990
through 2001 and consisted of more than 3,800 observations. The sample size used for the estima-
tion was reduced due to missing information about prices, varieties, availability or vintage data, but
still amounts to a total of 3,055 observations. We analyze separate models for red and white varieties
in order to see differential impacts due to the basic wine color.
Tables 1 and 2 (including notes) provide some key information and sample statistics for the
data. For the estimation, we differentiate eleven regions in six countries and ten varieties as well as
red and white wines in general. Napa was chosen as the base region and Cabernet Sauvignon as the
base variety (Chardonnay in the white wine sample). For the whole sample, the average score is 86.2
points, ranging from 61 to 97. The average nominal price is $29.19 ranging from $5 to $195. The
average age of a wine when judged is 2.45 years and the expert opinion on the maturing potential of
wines is 2.8 years on average.  About 2/3 of the wines are red varieties and about 1/3 white varieties.
The paper addresses producer reputation effects and their potential impact of regional origin
on consumer willingness to pay for premium wine. This may help to assess the significance of sub-
jective preferences in international markets. In markets for experience goods, such expert evalua-
tions direct consumers to a particular product or producer association. Although we employ producer
reputation effects via dummy variables derived from producer and regional averages, we also ex-
plored other avenues. We ran each model directly using producer averages or their deviations from
the regional averages. We note that these variables are highly correlated and thus yield similar re-
                                                          
4 The reported price is a suggested retail price on release and prior to tasting. This price may differ from actual consumer
transaction prices due to retail mark-ups and government taxes differ.
5 Note that the estimated regional effects (measured on the regional dummy variables) will be mitigated through the
producer quality signal derived from the regional averages.8
sults.  Moreover, assuming uncertain consumers, it seems more reasonable to use a less precise
measure when modeling producer quality signals. We include a set of indicator variables for grape
variety as well as the age and maturing potential at the time of judging as we expect that aged wines
(especially reds and/or those with a high potential to mature) will achieve higher prices.
  Although we use a mixed log-linear functional form, the results are robust to model specifi-
cation.
6  The core model estimated in this paper is:
  (2)       log(P) = α + β1 log(Sq) + β2 log(A) + γ1He + γ2Le + γ3BB + γ4 SS + δ1Age + δ2Pot + ηjVa + θkReg + ε
where log(P) is the logarithm of the suggested release price in US$. Given the functional form this
equation, β1 measures the price elasticity of the quality rating, β2 the price elasticity of the availabil-
ity (scarcity) indicator.  The γ coefficients measure the premiums/discounts for high/ low-end quality
producers and for the two special expert designations. The δ coefficients for Age and Pot indicate the
percentage premium paid for older and maturing  wines while η and θ measure price premi-
ums/discounts for regional origin and variety, respectively.  Reg and Va denote dummy variable ma-
trices for regional origin and variety.  Estimating equation (2) results in a vector of coefficients rela-
tive to the contribution of the base control.
Estimation Results
Table 3 lists the regression results for the three hedonic models. Most estimates are highly
significant (except for one variety), and F-tests show that adding these variables will significantly
improves the model fit. With respect to sensory expert evaluations of both red and white wine, prices
are highly elastic (about 2.44% or 71¢ at the average price). Producer quality signal also affect prices
significantly. However, it is interesting to see that high-quality producers receive much higher pre-
mium (22%) compared to the discount for low-quality producers (6.5%). Moreover, note that the
estimated premium for high-end producers is 4% larger for white wines while the discount for low-
end producers is 2.5% smaller for red wine. Thus, red (white) wine producers are to gain less (more)
from consistently producing higher qualities, but would also loose less (more) form consistent under-
performance.
                                                          
6 A RESET F-test does not reject this functional formulation but the others including linear and log-linear.9
As expected, we estimate that wine prices increase with age (+15%) and maturing potential
(+3.7%), and that the premium for both of these variables is much larger for reds. Special selections
(SS) control an average 10% premium while best buy designations (BB) carry a 20% discount. The
"availability" coefficients are negative and highly significant in all three samples.  This suggests that
a small scarcity effect may be present which is somewhat larger for red wines, where a 1% increase
in the number of cases made results in a 0.13% decrease in price. A more detailed look at variety
effects suggests that prices for Cabernet blends are not significantly different from the base variety, a
pure Cabernet Sauvignon. Only the low yielding Pinot Noirs sell at a premium (+7.5%). The other
estimated variety discounts vary up to –25% for a Zinfandel.
Comparing the three models, the most interesting results come from the relative contribution
of regional origin to prices. The price discounts for regional origin are quite large, varying between
16% and almost 60% (relative to the Napa base appellation). Apart from the residual “Other Califor-
nia” region, the domestic regions command higher prices than wines imported form other New
World sources. We argue that the regional origin estimates reflect both brand values and reputation,
because the data is at least in part consistent with models of quality-price signaling.  In particular,
the ranking of the estimated premiums for the domestic regions corresponds exactly to the regional
quality ranking in Table 2. However, including the foreign regions, this correspondence brakes
down.
 For example, the average New Zealand wine rates 87 points second only to the Napa base, but
the estimated discount of 30% is almost twice as high as for Sonoma wine rating only 86.5 points on
average. Part of this may be explained by a consumer home bias, which warrants some further in-
vestigation below.
Let us turn to the mitigating effects of quality producer signals on the estimated regional ef-
fects. Producers within a region may benefit or suffer from each other's quality performance due to
spillover effects. As consumers pay closer attention to differences among producers and their prod-
ucts, the price-quality relationship within a region becomes less complementary and more competi-
tive. A high regional quality performance facilitates quality-based competition among producers and
may diminish the importance of collective regional indicators.  Figure 1 depicts the estimated re-
gional effects superimposing the adjustments due to high and low quality producer signals. Although10
these adjustments preserve the regional rankings, they reveal some interesting results. No foreign
wine, even from high-end producers, exceeds their counterparts from average Napa producers. Only
white wines from top New Zealand producers almost reach parity (-0.6%). White wines from top
South African producers carry less than half of their average discount and fetch slightly higher prices
than white wines from average North Coast producers. Red wines from top Australian producers
secure higher prices than reds from average Sonoma producers, but still sell below reds from a low-
end Napa source. In general, we conclude that it is problematic to interpret regional premiums as
brand value (as opposed to a quality premium) without making adjustments for producer quality. For
this reason, we argue that the estimated brand values of up to 50% in Brooks (2001) may be biased.
Moreover, similar to individual producers, entire regions have a track record of quality evaluations,
which in the eyes of consumer marks them as a high or low quality-producing region. In order to
fully disentangle brand values and estimated regional premiums, an additional indicator correcting
for regional quality should be incorporated in the analysis.
Discussion and Conclusion
At least three lessons can be drawn from these results. A first lesson is that expert quality as-
sessments and producer quality signals appear to have a significant positive impact on the prices that
consumers are willing to pay for premium wines, even after correcting for grape varieties and re-
gional origin. This general finding is consistent with other studies and suggests consumer’s value
this information in their quest for greater knowledge about available wines. Moreover, as consumers
become more confident in their one ability to discern quality, they become less reliant on imperfect
signals, including generic regional quality indicators (Tirole, 1996).  Producer quality indicators are
large and may negate an estimated regional discount as in the case of high-end South Coast produc-
ers. Moreover, strong positive producer quality signals carry a larger percentage premium than com-
parable negative signals.
A second lesson is a clear trend towards greater regional differentiation (see Figure 1). A
contributing factor to this trend may be the registration of geographical indications providing for
stronger property rights and value in regional names, thereby raising the rates of return on invest-
ments in regional promotion. We estimate significant relative differences between growing regions,11
warranting important marketing implications for individual producers as well as entire wine growing
regions.  Because regional reputation is a public good, it may be useful to engage in activities to en-
hance the reputation of particular wine growing areas or of varieties from a region. Our results sug-
gest that for regions trading primarily red wine such as Australia, marketing regional origin as a
quality attribute may be quite rewarding. Australia’s sensory quality rating for reds is second only to
Napa but it carries an estimated regional discount of 40%. Moreover, for regions primarily growing
white wine it seems that a marketing strategy emphasizing regional origin is less rewarding and their
producers would benefit more from individual marketing efforts (e.g. New Zealand’s top producers
almost reach parity with Napa). This finding is also consistent with Schamel (2000). However, it
remains to be seen whether regional indicators become more or less important over time. On the one
hand, regions are investing more in generic promotion. On the other, globalization is causing indi-
vidual wineries to agglomerate and put more emphasis on building a corporate brand reputation. Our
analysis raises the question whether the estimated regional premiums are to be interpreted as a qual-
ity premium, a brand value or both. We conclude that they are both and that they need to be adjusted
for producer as well as regional quality signals to get an idea of regional brand values. This paper is
a first step and includes an adjustment for producer quality signals. The second step requires a larger
data set in order to define regional quality signals and will be accomplished in a future paper.
The third lesson relates to Tirole (1996). He suggests that consumers forming their buying
decisions may rely on approximate quality signals when access to more proximate signals is difficult
or costly. Not all consumers may have access to individual wine quality evaluations but may have an
idea about high and low quality producers within a region or may be exposed to regional marketing
or brand promotion. In the current context, this would help to explain part of the home bias as
proximity may imply a more complete consumer knowledge about high and low quality producers
and/or a greater exposure to regional marketing and brand promotion. U.S. consumers might miss
the more accurate quality signals from foreign sources and more of the foreign price variation is then
captured by their regional dummy variable. The fact that price differentials and significance levels
on the foreign regions are much larger points in this direction.12
Finally, we ought to mention some characteristic features of the wine industry studied in this
paper. It is probably save to say that wine quality evaluations receive a high level of consumer atten-
tion, with several major publications providing wine quality ratings on a regular basis, not to men-
tion the regional or variety ‘fashion’ trends in wine consumption that these publications may deter-
mine. Moreover, the quality of each vintage is affected by many factors beyond producer control.13
Table 1: Description of the Data
 †
Variable Short description ∅∅∅∅ Min. Max.
Price
 1 P Suggested retail price on release 29.19 5 195
Sensory quality
 2 Sq Point score from blind tasting (max. 100 pts.) 86.2 61 97
Availability
 3 A Approx. # of cases made with particular label 12,437 38 1.1M
Potential
 4 Pot Potential to improve with age (years) 2.83 0 14
Age Age Judging year minus Vintage (in years) 2.45 0 9
High-end
 5 He High-end quality producer (dummy variable)
Low-end
 5 Le Low-end quality producer (dummy variable)
Best Buy
 6 BB Outstanding value at modest price (dummy)
Special Selection
 7 SS Selected, highly recommended wines (dummy)
Variety
 8 Va Wine variety (categorical dummy)
Region
 9 Reg Regional origin (categorical dummy)
Table 2: Regional Statistics
All Wines Red Wine White Wine
Regions
 9 Count ∅∅∅∅  Price ∅∅∅∅  Score Count ∅∅∅∅  Price ∅∅∅∅  Score Count ∅∅∅∅  Price ∅∅∅∅  Score
Napa 741 44.69 87.5 551 50.62 87.6 190 27.52 87.1
Sonoma 567 31.12 86.5 386 32.60 86.3 181 27.96 87.1
South Coast 208 29.05 85.9 145 30.72 85.7 63 25.21 86.5
Central Coast 144 28.29 85.6 90 32.92 85.7 54 20.57 85.3
North Coast 121 23.17 85.1 81 25.62 85.4 40 18.23 84.6
Other California 236 16.30 84.0 167 17.69 84.3 69 12.94 83.4
All California 2,017 33.48 86.4 1,420 37.27 86.4 597 24.47 86.3
NEW ZEALAND 123 19.13 87.0 31 25.68 86.3 92 16.92 87.3
AUSTRALIA 535 23.84 86.5 380 26.82 87.0 155 16.54 85.3
SOUTH AFRICA 124 17.77 84.9 81 19.95 85.1 43 13.65 84.5
CHILE 157 16.65 84.4 112 18.92 84.9 45 11.00 83.0
ARGENTINA 99 17.45 83.8 79 18.94 83.6 20 11.60 84.5
All Regions 3,055 29.19 86.2 2,103 32.87 86.3 952 21.06 85.9
Notes: (data source: Wine Spectator Online at www.winespectator.com).
1 Release prices as published in the Wine Spectator magazine as well as online.
2 Scale: 95-100 (classic; a great wine)  70-79 (average; drinkable, may have minor flaws)
90-94 (outstanding; superior character and style)  60-69 (below average; drinkable, not recommended)
80-89 (good to very good; with special qualities) 50-59 (poor; undrinkable, not recommended).
3 Availability estimates stated in the tasting notes.
4 Maximum storage potential in years based on the expert opinion at the time of tasting (e.g. drink now = 0).
5 The average quality of high-end (low-end) producers deviates by more than 2 points from the regional average.
6 Value for money designation awarded after blind tasting procedure (incl. best buy, smart buy, and best value).
7 Includes highly recommended (selected highest-scoring wines in an issue), cellar selections (will improve most with
aging), and spectator selections (not necessarily highest scoring, but make a most out-standing purchase).
8 Variety (#, ∅  price, ∅  score): Cabernet Sauvignon (520, $43.51, 86.8), Cabernet Blends (116, $34.59, 86.4), Merlot
(262, $27.58, 85.7), Pinot Noir (337, $35.34, 85.8), Shiraz (329, $28.70, 87.1), Zinfandel (260, $25.02, 85.6), Other
Red (279, $26.57, 86.0), Chardonnay (580, $24.16, 86.4), Sauvignon Blanc (219, $15.40, 85.5), Other White (153,
$17.39, 84.9). Cabernet Sauvignon (Chardonnay in white sample) are base varieties.
9 California regions are defined as follows:
Napa incl. Napa Vly. and Carneros (chosen as base region)
Sonoma incl. Sonoma Vly./Co.
Central Coast incl. Bay Area, Central Coast, and Monterey Co.
North Coast incl. Mendocino, Lake, and Solano Co.
South Coast incl. Santa Barbara Co., Paso Robles, Santa Maria, Santa Ynez, and Edna Vlys.
Other California incl. all other California wine and non-specified blends from above.14
Table 3: Regression Results [dep. variable = log(Price)]
All Wines Red Wine White Wine
Parameter Estimate (t-statistic) Estimate (t-statistic) Estimate (t-statistic)
CONSTANT -6.908 (-6.44)* -6.818 (-4.87)* -7.065 (-4.41)*
Log(Score) 2.439 (10.13)* 2.425 (7.70)* 2.440 (6.80)*
Log(Cases) -0.118 (-28.57)* -0.127 (-23.87)* -0.105 (-17.15)*
Potential 0.037 (10.20)* 0.040 (8.71)* 0.020 (2.81)*
Age 0.150 (17.51)* 0.163 (15.70)* 0.106 (7.09)*
High-end 0.219 (12.41)* 0.206 (9.18)* 0.246 (9.06)*
Low-end -0.065 (-3.42)* -0.059 (-2.47)** -0.083 (-2.85)*
Best Buy -0.202 (-5.25)* -0.246 (-4.92)* -0.112 (-2.03)**
Special Selection 0.104 (2.62)* 0.122 (2.42)** 0.090 (1.49)
Sonoma -0.161 (-8.53)* -0.203 (-8.41)* -0.061 (-2.17)**
South Coast -0.219 (-8.20)* -0.266 (-7.76)* -0.106 (-2.71)*
Central Coast -0.250 (-8.25)* -0.291 (-7.25)* -0.177 (-4.22)*
North Coast -0.371 (-11.44)* -0.421 (-10.09)* -0.264 (-5.58)*
Other California -0.510 (-18.78)* -0.511 (-14.82)* -0.474 (-11.48)*
NEW ZEALAND -0.305 (-9.15)* -0.393 (-6.09)* -0.252 (-7.06)*
AUSTRALIA -0.404 (-19.30)* -0.392 (-14.23)* -0.391 (-12.83)*
CHILE -0.541 (-16.81)* -0.518 (-12.49)* -0.558 (-11.47)*
SOUTH AFRICA -0.551 (-16.27)* -0.571 (-12.57)* -0.482 (-10.30)*
ARGENTINA -0.597 (-15.54)* -0.555 (-11.77)* -0.702 (-10.80)*
Cabernet Blends 0.040 (1.17) 0.043 (1.18)
Merlot -0.171 (-6.90)* -0.155 (-5.92)*
Pinot Noir 0.075 (2.87)* 0.110 (3.81)*
Shiraz -0.157 (-6.26)* -0.150 (-5.46)*
Zinfandel -0.257 (-9.72)* -0.234 (-8.13)*
Other Reds -0.154 (-5.98)* -0.149 (-5.37)*
Chardonnay -0.125 (-5.30)*
Sauvignon Blanc -0.239 (-7.20)* -0.179 (-6.88)*
Other Whites -0.235 (-6.86)* -0.141 (-5.33)*
N 3055 2103 952
R
2 [%] 74.20 71.82 74.64
adj. R
2 [%] 73.97 71.50 74.10
RESET F-statistic 1.667 1.018 2.250
* and ** indicates significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.15
Figure 1: Regional Discounts and Adjustments for High and Low-end Producers
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